Tatarstan's Treaty with Russia: Autonomy or Independence


In February 1994, Tatarstan and Russia signed a treaty defining their political and economic relations within the Russian Federation. This was a big surprise, as well as disappointment, to the Tatar national movement which expected the treaty to bring about a well-defined independence. Also, it was an achievement for President Boris Yeltsin, who could use this treaty as a model to settle Russia's relationships with the twenty other autonomous republics and some of the oblasts which were aspiring to become autonomous republics. Here, an attempt is made to analyze the nature and scope of this treaty in the light of current dynamics and historical perspectives which the Tatars and Russians have nurtured since the middle of the sixteenth century.

In December 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed unexpectedly, fear was widespread in Russia that the multi-ethnic Russian Federation would not be able to preserve its territorial integrity. Additionally there was fear that Russia would use force to keep Muslim-Turkic nationalities in the Russian Federation. Some observers, both within Russia and abroad, expected the emergence of independent, states of Tatarstan in the Volga-Ural Basin and that of Chechnia in the caucuses. In these regions, they were the focal point of discontent and self-assertion for political sovereignty. The prospects for the breakup of the Russian Federation were further accentuated by the duality of power that prevailed in Moscow. between the Russian supreme Soviet, which was still dominated by the Communist Old Guard and President Yeltsin.


This duality of power was brought to a climax by Yeltsin in September 1993 when he dissolved the Supreme Soviet and called for new elections of the legislature in December 1993 and the presidential elections in June 1994.

The Russian Constitutional Court ruled on September 22, 1993 that Yeltsin had violated the Constitution and could be impeached. Consequently, the legality appeared to be on the parliament's side. Also, the defiant Vice President, Aleksander V. Rustkoi, denounced the move as a coup d'etat and assumed full state powers. The parliament's Chairman, Russian I. Khasbulatov, a Chechin Muslim, called on the Armed Forces to disobey Yeltsin. While the Congress of the Peoples Deputies voted to call simultaneously parliamentary and presidential elections by March 1994, Yeltsin rejected the call and ordered the Interior and Defense Ministries to disarm the guards of the White House (Parliament) and evict the legislators. Complying with Yeltsin's decree, the Russian troops sealed off the White House in order to maintain "law and order" in the vicinity.

Clearly, Yeltsin had retained the loyalty of the Russian armed forces who assaulted the White House with tanks, forcing the legislators out of the building. Finally, Yeltsin appeared the undisputed victor in a showdown with the parliament. Promptly, he disbanded the Communist and ultra-nationalist parties. Physically exhausted and bedraggled, Khasbulatov sat in a chair in the While House and humbly muttered: "I never thought he [Yeltsin] would do this. Why isn't anyone coming to help us." [1]

Like the Communists who led the abortive coup in August 1991 against Gorbachev, Rustkoi and Khasbultov were convinced that the silent majority and the Armed Forces were on their side and longed for a return of the CPSU's centralized and authoritarian rule. They proved wrong. Communism and its stalwarts had forfeited the sympathies and support of the common man in Russia and in other republics.

Whether or not Yeltsin's action against the Parliament was legal is now a moot point. However, "the Yeltsin coup" had a profound psychological impact on Russian citizens and the leaders of the eighty-eight regions that make up the Russian Federation. With deadly force, Yeltsin had especially conveyed the message to twenty-one autonomous republics, including Talarstan, that he was determined to use force against his personal opponents and the secessionist leaders in the regions. Consequently, Tatarstan's negotiations for independence and sovereignty must be analyzed against the background of the coups of August 1991 against Gorbachev and that of October 1995 of Yeltsin against the Russian Parliament. Fear of the Russian Bear once again prevailed in Tatarstan weakening the national resolve for independence.

During 1990-91, when Yeltsin was engaged in a struggle for power against Gorbachev, he visited Tatarstan and encouraged the Tatar leaders with a statement which came to haunt him subsequently: "Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow" [2]. Consequently, Tatarstan, along with Chechnia, refused on March 13. 1992 to sign the Federal Treaty which Yeltsin offered in order to grant some autonomy to the ethnic autonomous republics. The treaty dealt with finance, infrastructure, environment, social protection, foreign relations, natural resources and the state of emergency requirements and in a convoluted formula recognized the "state sovereignty of the republics within the Russian Federation." [3].

In July 1993, the Constitutional Conference which Yeltsin had set up in defiance of the Parliament extended to the autonomous republics an opportunity to adopt their own constitutions, national anthems and flags. In reaction to this liberal policy, some oblasts, including Yakaterinburg Yeltsin's former fief as a Communist Party secretary, declared itself the Republic of the Urals, followed by Vladivostok, which threatened to proclaim itself a maritime republic. Also, Ktasnoyarsk started planning with Irkutsk to create an east Siberian republic. These oblasts' proclamations were not necessarily viewed as a potential breakup of Russia in the way that the USSR was split up. Nevertheless, the Russian right wing exploited these developments to attack Yeltsin as indulgently weak, encouraging the centrifugal forces unleashed by the ethnic republics. The right wing's criticism began to sting when it was known that Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia had stopped paying federal taxes.

In the second week of July 1993, the Russian Constitutional Conference adopted a new constitulion for the Federation with 433 to 62 votes, with 63 abstentions. Only 8 of the 21 ethnic republics initialed the draft and about 1/3 of the oblast leaders did not do so. These interrelated developments had generated the Constitutional crisis that culminated in the attack on the Russian parliament which had refused to accept the legality, as well as the legitimacy, of the Constitutional Conference organized by Yeltsin in order to bypass the parliament.


Since 1991, to February 1994, Tatarstan's negotiations with Russia had dragged along inconclusively. The negotiations between the two sides reflected the psychology of each in political terms. However, a part of the Tatars' psychology is determined by their historical encounter with Russia and their never-ending yearning for national freedom. In their psychological makeup and aspirations, Islam has played a defining role. Without Islam, Tatars assert, they would have been assimilated into the Russian culture and absorbed into the Russian Orthodox Christianity, retaining no trace of their own Bulgar-Tatar identity [4].

Bulgars, the ancestors of Tatars. were the Turkic people who settled in the middle Volga and lower Kama region during the first half of the eighth century. Islam appeared among them in the ninth century. However, in 922 a determined attempt to spread Islam among the Bulgars was made when the Abbasid Caliph, Jafar AI-Muktadir, sent Ahmed lbn-Fadhlan, a missionary, to the Bulgar state. His mission converted practically the entire Bulgar population to Islam by the end of the tenth century. [5] Russia was then confined to Kiev and the lands of Moscovy.

In the eleventh centuries Bulgar stale had expanded when its borders reached the River Zai and in the south touched the Samara. From the tenth to the thirteenth centuries the Bulgar State and the Russian principalities established trade relations, but also frequently clashed with each other. In 1225 the fear of Mongol invasion temporarily ended the hostilities. During these centuries, however, the Bulgar state had achieved a high level of culture and civilization. (Some ruins of their magnificent mosques and palaces are still visible in the port city of Bulgar, not very far from Kazan, which I visited in the summer of 1993). Khorazmian Turkic in the Arabic script was widely used as the literary language, as it was then widely used in Crimea [6].

The Mongol invasion which was feared most by the Bulgars and the Russians in 1225 became a reality in 1236 when Chingis Khan's (d.1227) Grandson, Batu (d.1255), invaded the Bulgar state and conquered its territory. Subsequently, Batu's Army conquered Russia in the winter of 1240. The Bulgars conquered by the Mongols were drafted into Batu's army as Tatars, the conquered people. Consequently, in the Russian perception, the Mongolian invasion came to be known as the Tatar conquest.

The Mongols (in Russian historiography, the Tatars) ruled over Russia for 250 years. Commenting on their rule, D. Mackenzie Wallace (writing in 1870s) stated: "The Khans never dreamed of attempting to Tatarize their Russian subjects. They demanded simply an oath of allegiance from the Princes, and a certain sum of tribute from the people. The vanquished were allowed to retain their land, their religion, their language, their courts of justice, and all their other institutions." [7] It is a strange quirk of history that Batu's descendant, Berke Khan (ruled 1256-1266) adopted Islam, the religion of the Tatars instead of Christianity, the religion of the Russians. This conversion of the Mongols to Islam generated the synthesis of Mongol with that of the Tatar culture and eventually Mongols were totally assimilated. Consequently, the Mongol history became the Tatar patrimony.

The Kazan Khanate, the successor to the Bulgar state and the Golden Horde, was located in the mid Ural Basin, around the confluence of the Volga and Kama Rivers. This territory corresponded approximately to the territorial extent of the Tatar autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic which was established in 1920 by Lenin. The present republic of Tatarstan occupies the territory of 67.8 thousand square kilometers and borders with the republics of Mariy-el, Udmurtia, Chuvashia, and Bashkortostan. The latter is Turkic-Muslim and the Bashkorts use basically the Tatar language with variation in accents determined by their geographic regions. The population is 3.68 million people: 48.5 percent are Tatars; 43.5 percent are Russians, 3.7 percent are Chuvashes and the balance is composed of other nationalities.

The protracted conflict between the Tatars and the Russians came to a climax in 1572 when Ivan the Terrible conquered the Tatar state and firmly established the Russian rule. Russian state came to include for the first time non-Slavic and non-Christian population, which was essentially Central Asian in its cultural makeup and was settled in the land which was an extension of the same land mass. Before the conquest of the Kazan Khanate the Tsardom of Moscoy contained original Russian territory of 47,000 square miles. [8] After the conquest it was enlarged to include 127,000 square miles. Ivan the Terrible and his successors ruled Tatars with repressive policies which included (1) anti-Islamic campaigns and forced conversion of Muslim Tatars to Christianity; (2) cultural assimilation; 3) confiscation of fertile Tatar lands in the river values and allotting them to the Russians; and finally (4) disbursing the Tatars to Central Asia [9].

Wallace also shed light on the anti-Islamic campaigns and mass conversions of the Tatars (I was informed in the summer of 1994 that approximately 100,000 baptized Tatars still live in Tatarstan). Converts were called upon to firmly and unwaveringly hold the Christian faith and its dogmas. According to Wallace, the Government ordered its officials to "pacify, imprison, put in irons, and thereby unteach and frighten from the Tatar faith those who, though baptized, don't obey the admonitions of the metropolitan highest religious authority of the Russian Orthodox Chirch. [10]. A person convicted of converting a Christian to Islam was sentenced according to the criminal code with the loss of all civil rights and imprisonment with hard labor for a term of 8-10 years.'' [11] It was estimated that by 1725 some 40,000 Tatars had been baptized. In 1740, the Russian Government ordered that all newly built mosques be destroyed and the construction of new ones prohibited [12].

Forced conversions led some Tatars to drown themselves in the Volga River. Even today, with tears in their eyes, Tatars narrate to their children the tragedy of these doomed people, who became Shahid (martyrs) in their eyes. The confiscation of fertile lands forced others to flee to Liberia and Central Asia. where Tatar communities exist even today. Moreover, Tatars were forbidden to live in Kazan and its environs. [13] A picture of the Tatar diaspora in the Twentieth Century can be gathered in the following table:

Location of Tatars in the Soviet Union Republics' 1926 to 1989

	Union Republics Population
1926 1937 1959 1970 1979 1989 Russia 3214,043 3,610,780 4,074,699 4,757,913 5,016,087 5,543,371 Ukranian 22,281 24,242 61,527 76,212 90,542 133,596 Beloruss 3,777 3,475 8,654 10,031 10,911 12,552 Uzbek 28,297 27,960 44,810 573,733 648,764 656,601 Kazakh 79,758 92,096 191,925 287,712 313,460 331,151 Georgian 599   5,441 5,856 5,165 4,714 Azerbaija 9,948   29,552 31,787 31,350 28,564 Lithuanian     3,023 3,460 4,006 5,188 Moldova     1,047 1,850 2,637 3,477 Latvian     1,836 2,688 3,372 4,888 Kirghiz 4,902 17,483 56,266 69,373 72,018 72,992 Tajik 982 16,604 56,893 70,803 79,529 79,442 Armenian 27   577 581 753 506 Turkistan 4,790   29,946 36,457 40,321 39,277 Estonian     1,535 2,205 3,195 4,070

After more than 200 years, the Russian state's persecution of the the Tatars was modified by Catherine II. Under her, a law in 1776 revoked rules restricting the trade activity of Tatar merchants. In 1784, Catherine reestablished the rights of the Tatar gentry, which had demonstrated its loyalty to her by opposing Pugachev's rebellion. (Bashkorts. on the other hand, under their national leader, Salavat Julayev. supported Pugachev's campaigns. An impressive statue of Salavat Julayev stands at a massive height in Ufa, not very far from the Bashkort Supreme Soviet). This act organized the Muslim ecclesiastical structure, and laid the foundation for Islamic education, making subsequent development of Tatar national life possible.'' [14]

On the eve of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, the basis of the Tatar culture was Islam, free trading enterprises, [which had spread to Central Asia] and strong nationalism. These elements could not co-exist with the so-called internationalist, egalitarian, atheistic an consequently anti-Islamic principles of the new Russian rulers, who were determined to Russify Tatars In the name of a secular ideology.

To cope with Bolshevikism, some Tatar leaders, particularly under the leadership of Mir Said Sultan Caliev. developed the ideology of national communism implying that there existed proletarian nations which were exploited by others - a clear reference to the Tatar repression by the Russians.

Ideologically, non-proletarian nations could bypass the capitalistic stage of development and leap directly from feudalism or pre capitalism to socialism. In his very shrewd interpretations of Marrxism-Leninism, Galiev' stated: "All Muslim colonized peoples are proletarian peoples and as almost all classes in Muslim society have been repressed by the colonialists, all classes have the right to be called proletarians therefore, it is legitimate to say that the national liberation movement in Muslim countries has the character of a socialist revolution." [15]

Mir Said Sultan Galiev and other national communist leaders were very much instrumental in promoting the concept of the ldel-Oural State. In principle it was conceded on March 23, 1918 when Pravda carried the NARKOMNATS' (Peoples' Commissariat of Nationalities) decree proclaiming the "territory of southern Ural and middle Volga the Tatar Bashkir Soviet Republic of the Russian Soviet Federation." The decree had the signatures of Joseph Stalin, Mulla Noor Vashitov, Sh. Manatov, and G.Ibragimov. The decree was not approved by the Bolshevik Party organization, but it evoked a great deal of support from Tatars and even some Bashkorts. In May 1918, the Chuvash and Mordivinian people also expressed their support, and requested that their territories be included in the Idel-Oural Republic. Only some diehard communists in Kazan and Ufa and the Oliral Soviets opposed the idea of a Tatar-Bashkort Republic on the grounds that it would encourage nationalism.

Suillian Galiev formally submitted the ldel-Oural Republlic proposal to the second All-Russian Congress of the Organisations of the Peoples of the East, which met in Moscow between November 22 and December 3, 1919. However, on December 13, 1919, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party's Politburo, which was then completely dominated by Lenin, decided not to create the Idel-Oural Republic. Instead. Lenin split the Bashkorts from the Tatars and on March 23, 1919 created the Bashkir Autonoltlous Soviet Socialist Republic. The following year, the Soviet Government. (May 27, 1920) issued a decree to establish the Tatar ASSR. Only 1,459,000 of the 4.200,000 Tatars living in the middle Volga area were included in the republic. The Soviet Government also excluded on June 14. 1922 the districts of Beleveev, Birsk, and Ufa where Tatars represented the majority of the population from the Tatar republic and joined them with Bashkortostan. [16] This made the Tatars represent the second largest ethnic majority after the Russians in Bashkortostan.

Tatar nationalists have maintained that the Soviet Government had promised referendums in these districts in order to determine the wishes of the population, hut the Bashkorts vehemently deny it. In fact, the Bashkorts assert that in the 1920s in these three districts Bashkorts were in the majority over the Tatars. Additionally, the subsequent mass repression of the Bashkorts by the Bolsheviks depopulated these regions, eventually turning them into the minority.

Since 1552, Tatars and Russians have developed stereotypes of each other. In the Russian perception, a Tatar is "cruel", "uncivilized", "an aggressor and an eternal enemy", who made them carry the Tatar yoke for 250 years. These negative images are passed on to successive generations. [17] Tatars, on the other hand, look upon the Russians as "lawless rulers" oppressors of other nationalities", who are determined to Russify them in order "to wipe them out." (Lenin once in a fit of liberality called the Russian Stare "a jailhouse of nationalities.") The concept of Tatar yoke provides eternal justification for Russia's domination over the Tatars. However, it is overlooked, that the Mongol aggression was vacated from the Russian lands, and that the Russian population did not have to endure the cultural process of Tatarization. Russian domination of the Tatars, on the other hand, has acquired a seemingly endless character. Russia looks upon Tatar lands as its own, and the Tatar population a national minority.

The memory of the Tatar yoke was also present in Lenin's mind. He refused to accord the Status of Union Republic both to Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. In September 1919 when the Idol-Oural proposal was submitted to him, it included not only the territories of Tatarstan, but also Bashkortostan and the three oblasts of Orenburg, Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk. Lenin instead established the two autonomous republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, and then interposed between Kazakstan and Bashkortostan the three oblasts of Orenburg, Magnitoyorsk, and Chelyabinsk, thus surrounding the conceptual state of Idol-Oural by the Russian territory. This development also denied the two autonomous states the constitutional right of secession from the USSR, since they were now surrounded by the Russian territory. The right of secession was conceded to the I5 Union Republics.

Without grasping the Russian-Tatar relations' current dynamics and their historical interaction, their negotiations cannot be appreciated. In the process of negotiating a new set of relations in the post-Soviet period, both negotiators made constant references to the past, and then riveted their attention to the contemporary imperatives.


Since 1990, four rounds of negotiations have been held between the two parties in Moscow. The Tatar government's strategy was by no means to have a head-on collision with the overwhelming power of Russia and to maintain social peace in the Republic. This, despite the fact that strong Tatar nationalist leaders and parties were not reluctant to take up arms against Russia in order to achieve national self-determination. President Mintimer Shaimiev's government and the opposition parties had a tacit understanding to achieve the following objectives: (I) confederal arrangements with Russia while retaining complete independence of Tatarstan; (2) membership in the United Nations; (3) international recognition of Tatarstan's sovereignty, with a guarantee of economic sovereignty, and (4) full control over natural resources, including specifically oil, over and under Tatarstan's territory'.

Under Mintimer Shaimiev's leadership, Tatarstan's Supreme Soviet took the first bold step, on August. 30, 1990 when the declaration of stale sovereignty was made, declaring the economic resources of the Republic as its "exclusive property." The declaration should not be read as a declaration of secession. The Supreme Soviet only "reformed" Tatarstan's status to that of the Union Republic, equal to that of the fifteen other republics. Also, it made Russian and Tatar the state languages. In 1991, the positions of President and Vice President were introduced in the Republic, and Mintimer Shaimiev was elected the first President and Vasily Likhachev Vice-President on June 21st.


In order to achieve the status of Union Republic the Tatars' leaders opened negotiations with Moscow on August 12, 1991. The well-known members of the Tatar delegation were Rafael Khakimov, (then the principle advisor to Tatarstan' s President) and Mr. Indus Rizzakovich Tagirov, who is a leading scholar of the Tatar studies and Dean of the Historical Faculty of Kazan University. In Moscow, President Yeltsin's principle negotiator with the Tatar delegation was his State Secretary, Gennady Burbolis.

The Tatar delegation rolled heavily upon the past Soviet commitments; however, under changed circumstances they had ceased to have any moral obligation for the Russians. The Tatars delegation nevertheless invoked the resolutions of the third Russian Congress of the Soviets, which was held in January 1.918, saying: (1) that the Russian Federation was based upon the principle of freedom and the equality of Soviet republics; (2)the republics were to join the Federation voluntarily; and (3) it was up to the republics to decide for themselves whether to join or to get out of the Federation.

Burbolis agreed with this historical invocation, but treated it merely as an ideological rhetoric. However, the August 19 coup against Gorbachev occurred while the negotiations were proceeding and political dynamics changed so radically that the Tatar delegation simply did not sign bilateral treaty with Russia.

During the negotiations, Burbolis proposed an idea of a referendum in Tatarstan in order to determine the preferences of the populations. Perhaps, he was counting on the loyalty of the resident Russians, to vote negatively on the question of sovereignty for Tatarstan. The Tatar leadership accepted the challenge, and organized a referendum on March 21. 1992 with this question: ''Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is the sovereign state, the subject of international law, forming its relations with the Russian Federation, other Republics and states on the basis of legal agreements?" The question, however, went beyond the scope of the declaration of the state sovereignty, when it added the words "other republics and states on the basis of equal agreement", in addition to Russia and other Union Republics. Stunningly, the result of the referendum was 61 percent in favor of Tatarstan's independence, 79 percent of the 2.5 million eligible voters had cast their ballots. Their breakdown is as follows:

	Referendum (Results) of March 21,1992
1. Total numher of eligible citizens 2,600,297 2. Number of citizens who received ballots 2,134,271 3. Number of participants 2,132,357 4. Number of citizens who answered yes 1,309,056 5. Number of citizens who answered no 794,444 6. Number of invalid ballots 28,851

However, on the eve of this referendum, Yeltsin, who was Gorbachev's successor as the President of the Russian Federation, and his advisers, took a very antagonistic position regarding this referendum. In a televised address, Yeltsin said that the referendum was aimed at secession and could lead to ethnic violence. President Shaimiev adopted a moderate and conciliatory attitude towards Russia and denied any plans to secede immediately. During the negotiations with Burbolis, the Tatar delegation had a clear understanding that Russia was not prepared to accept Tatar sovereignty and independence. Burbolis suggested that relations between Tatarstan and Russia would be asymmetrical and on the basis of some elements of confederation. When the Tatars pressed Burbolis to include the concept of Tatar sovereignty in a new treaty between the two republics, Burbolis shot back: "Then the sovereign rights of Russia must also be included in the Treaty."

In order to assert Russia's sovereign rights, Burbolis suggested that the elements of the Federal Treaty of March 13. 1992. which other autonomous republics had signed, should be integrated into the new treaty with Tatarstan. The Federal Treaty divided political power into three categories: (1) powers of the Russian Federation; (2) the joint jurisdictions; (3) and full power of the republics. Article I of the Federal Treaty listed twenty items of Russian state power, including 1) the federation's constitution and monitoring its observance, 2) protecting human and civil rights, and the rights of minorities; 3) forming federal state bodies; 4) protecting state property and its management; 5) establishing federal policies and programs in the field of state, economic, social, cultural and national development in the entire federation; 6) establishing the foundations of a unified market, finance, currency, credits and customs regulation, the issuance of money, pricing, policy, federal economic services including federal banks; 7) federal budget, federal taxes and fees, and federal funds for regional development; 8) federal power engineering systems, nuclear power engineering and fissionable materials, including transportation, railroads, information and communications, and activities in outerspace; 9) foreign policy and international relations and issues of war and peace; 10) foreign economic relations; 11) defense and security, including defense production and determining procedures for the sale and purchase of weapons; 12) protection of the state borders, territorial waters, economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation; 13) the judicial system and its related structures.

These thirteen categories of power are so comprehensive that no autonomous state could possibly escape Moscow total domination.

Article II enlisted eleven items under the categories of joint jurisdictions and Article III listed three items under full state power of the republics. Juxtaposing in opposite columns highlight the extent to which the autonomous states retained this cherished autonomy:

(Article II) Joint Jurisdictions (Article III) Full State Powers for the Republics 1.Ensuring that the republic constitutions correspond to the Russian laws and constitution; 1.Independent participant in international and foreign economic relations, if not at variance with the constitutional laws of Russia and this Treaty. Coordination to be exercised by Russia. 2.law and order and public safety; 2.Russian law and Republic's legislation to regulate use of land, subsidy resources, water and other natural resources. 3.use of natural resources, ecological safety 3. Republics' "preliminary consent" needed to proclaim a state of emergency in the republic, 4.education, science, culture, sports; 4.(Article IV & V) The republic and the Russian Federation can transfer the exercise of power to each other. 5.social security, protection of family. public health;   6.natural disasters and epidemic   7.taxation in the republics;   8.laws for labor, family, land, housing;   9.the system of notary's offices:   10.protection of small ethnic communities;   11.local self-government;   12.federal principles of legislation to he followed by the republics.

By March 13, 1992 only 18 autonomous republics had signed the treaty except Tatarstan and Chechniya. Bashkortostan signed it with a tour-point economic supplement. Resigned to re-establish Russian control over the destiny of the autonomous republics, the Federal Treaty was perceived in its true colors by the Tatar negotiators, who rejected it outright. Clearly, Article I of the Treaty established the sweeping powers of Moscow over the autonomous republics; Article II further reduced the scope of the republics' authority, and Article III lowered them to the status of minor municipal corporations. The Russian delegation, however, wanted the negotiations to continue. This desire led the parleys to a second round of negotiation.


The second phase started in March 1992, and ended in January 1993. By September 15, 1992, an understanding was tentatively reached by both sides to sign a bilateral treaty. At this point, Yeltsin canceled his scheduled visit to Japan, which had been organized by Burbolis. The right wing nationalists had mounted a vitriolic campaign against Burbolis, who was accused of being "soft" on the republics. Sergei Borisovich Stankevich, a member of the Russian negotiating team adopted an uncompromising position against the Tatars' objectives of Independence and sovereignty. Stankevich conducted a relentless campaign against Burbolis in the Russian Supreme Soviet. Consequently, Burbolls was removed, and Sergel Mikhailovich Shakhrai, who later became Russia's Vice-Premier, started to play the principal role in negotiations.

The two sides, however, signed an agreement on economic cooperation on January 22, 1992. Russia conceded that "Tatarstan controls the exploitation, output and sale of national resources without outside interference, first of all the sale of oil, oil and gas products." Russia was to receive its share of oil through "mutually beneficial annual agreements." [18] By August 15, 1992 Tatarstan's draft of the Treaty had been submitted to the Russian negotiators, where substantial disagreement between the two parties remained. However, the draft clearly declared the Republic of Tatarstan a sovereign state, "which independently executes all state authorities." [19]

Tatarstan also reserved the right to have an independent foreign policy and foreign economic relations, to establish military service, and its distribution of the Russian Federation's military units within Tatarstan. This was a substantial step forward, because the draft was signed by I. F. Boltenkova, Head of the Russian Experts, and F. G. Khamidullin, Head of the Tatar experts. Hope was raised that perhaps Tatarstan's sovereign status would be accepted by the political leaders of both sides.

These meetings were then adjourned to meet again in Moscow in February 1993. The Tatar delegation refused to participate in the proceedings of the constitutional conference.


By this time, a perception had developed within Russia and a road that Tatarstan was determined to secede from the Russian Federation. If this centrifugal impulse spread, Yeltsin and his advisors feared that the other autonomous republics will follow, causing the Russian Federation to split up. In order to forestall this eventuality Shakhai came to Kazan in June 1993 and successfully persuaded President Shaimiev to participate in the proceedings of the constitutional conference. The bargaining position was very simple: "If you refuse to participate, Moscow will refuse to continue negotiations on the status of Tatarstan.'' [20]

At the July 1993 constitutional conference, there were five groups, including the one dealing with the subjects of the Federation, where the Tatar delegation became active. Among the participants were leaders of various political parties, businessmen, representatives of local self governments, and the Government of the Russian Federation's representatives. According to the rules, all issues were to be settled by majority vote. The Tatar delegation's senior member, Raphael Khakimov, encountered an unknown Tatar Mulla at the constitutional conference, who claimed to represent a Tatar political party in Moscow. Evidently, some conveniently created political parties and their leaders in substantial numbers were present in the constitutional conference "to vote" according to Russian authorities' wishes; and to checkmate the nationalist leaders of the autonomous republics. [21]

Negotiations were conducted at the highest levels; Presidents Yeltsin and Shaimiev personally presented their respective cases. Tatarstan reiterated its now familiar position: (1) Tatarstan is a sovereign state; (2) it is subject to international law; and (3) is "associated" with the Russian Federation. Yeltsin proposed that the discussion of Tatarstan's status should he postponed; only issues susceptible to negotiated settlement should be thrashed out first. Subsequently, the two presidents would discuss the status question in order to find a mutually acceptable formula.

Consequently, the two sides initiated proposals on "joint and exclusive authorities." Russia wanted to have control over matters relating to outer space, standardization, defense and military production. Tatarstan refused to accept this proposal. In the category of "mutual authority" Russia listed (1) defense; (2) military industrial complex; (3) custom regulations; (4) banking systems; (5) payments to the Russian Federation, (6) division of state property; (7) defining joint property; (8) scientific fields of all kinds. The Tatar delegation conceded, in principle, that military and defense related installations in Tatarstan would be under the jurisdiction of Russia; but was not sure how these matters could be handled under joint authority.

Russia reacted to the Tatar position negatively. In order to make the Tatars realize the extent to which their economy was dependent on Russia, Moscow stopped financing the military industrial complex in Tatarstan, state orders for various items were reduced by 40 percent; and in some cases the orders dropped by 90 percent. No meaningful industrial conversion could be implemented. Consequently, Tatarstan's attitude changed on the issue of military-industrial complex. The new position clearly accepted the joint controls with the following reservations: (1) where Russia finances the weapons it would have exclusive control; and (2) in the civilian aspect of production, Tatarstan would retain full control.

Despite clarification of the tangled issues, no treaty between Russia and Tatarstan was signed, the latter still insisted on having complete independence in a conferral arrangement with a right to have representation in the United Nations the way Ukraine had under the USSR. Also, Tatarstan worked out a shrewd strategy with nine other autonomous republics in building a coalitional approach to tackle the constitutional issues of autonomy and sovereignty with the Yeltsin team of negotiators. These ten autonomous republics agreed on their (1) sovereign status; and 2) to structure the Russian Federation Treaty as the basis of the new constitution. Tatarstan, however, added two demands: 1) Tatarstan was to be excluded from the Russian draft constitution's Article 6, which enumerated the autonomous states, and 2) to have special relations with Russia in accordance with Article 61 of the Tatar constitution. [22]

Moscow's negotiator, Shakhrai, refused to discuss these conditions and deferred the issue to the so-called Presidential Group of Negotiators, who subsequently discussed them, but negatively. Essentially, Tatars wanted the special relations' article inserted in the constitution first, and then negotiate the scope of relations. Yeltsin's team wanted to reverse the process - Tatarstan should join the federation first, and then negotiate a treaty elaborately defining the relations. Consequently, the Tatar delegation walked out of the constitutional conference; but the delegates of other nine republics continued their participation. Thus, Yeltsln succeeded in isolating Tatarstan from its potential supporters.

In Kazan, President Shaimiev's government declared that the Tatar laws have assumed priority over the Russian laws; old laws remained applicable, but were to be abrogated or amended in the light of changed circumstances. The Kazan Government also let it be known that it would welcome other oblasts if they raised their status to that of autonomous republics. When the Saverdlovskaya oblast proclaimed itself to be an autonomous republic of the Oural, President Shaimiev's Principal Advisor, Raphael Khakimov, sent Tatarstan's congratulations offering to exchange envoys. Khakimov believed that Shakhrai was deliberately encouraging oblasts to follow the example of Saverdlovskaya in order to accuse Tatarstan of leading the campaign to split up the Russian Federation." [23]

However, an agreement was signed with Russia which enabled Tatarstan to establish strictly economic relations with Lithuania, Hungary, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Crimea. With the production of 600,000 barrels of oil a day, Tatarstan was to supply oil to these countries.

With Crimea, the economic agreement went beyond the oil supply; it was to include different kinds of vehicles produced at the KAMAZ installation, and other industrial products. The Tatar delegation (consisting of Deputy Prime Minister, Filza Khamidullin and Raphael Khakimov), which visited Crimea in January 1993, revealed in Crimea's capital. Simferopol, that Tatarstan would assist the Tatar diaspora in the Crimea, especially in its cultural development. This initiative might not have unduly disturbed Kiev, but alarm bells started to ring in Moscow, whose press screamed with headlines like - "Kazan Gains Access to Warm Seas". Through serpentine routes Tatar oil was to flow to Crimea. Tankers were to travel down the Volga and then through the Volga-Don Canal, coming out in the Sea of Azov, and ending up in the warm water parts of the Black Sea. "Tatarstan doesn't intend to stop there," Nezavisimaya Gazeta (March 2, 1993) stated continuously, Tatarstan's "draft agreements with Kazakhstan. Estonia, Latvia and Turkmenia have been prepared." [24] Surely, these agreements were signed, but these bold and imaginative initiatives did not lessen Tatarstan's economic dependence on Russia, whose tight control over its life remained intact. Nevertheless, the Yeltsin administration did not look upon these developments kindly, and perceived Tatarstan to be a very serious threat to the Russian Federation's territorial integrity, and at best, "a dangerous example" for other autonomous republics.

Yeltsin's tank attack on the White House certainly brought about a psychological change in Kazan, facilitating the final settlement which was formalized in February 1994 in the treaty between the two sides.


Unquestionably, after the signing of the treaty on February 15, 1994, Tatarstan is supposed to be governed by three legal documents: (1) the Constitution of the Russian Federation; (2.) the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, and (3) the Treaty of February 15, 1994. However, the Treaty of February- 1994 closely follows the pattern of the Federal Treaty of March 15, 1992; but leaves a wide margin of autonomy to Tatarstan. The sovereign status of Tatarstan is certainly not acknowledged, which is a source of great disappointment to the Tatar nationalists. Instead of being "associated", as Tatarstan had wanted, it is now "united" with the Russian Federation. Clearly, Article II recognizes Tatarstan's constitution, and then enumerates 15 areas of authority for the exclusive exercise of Tatarstan. Article III established 22 areas of joint authority. These powers are juxtaposed in the following two columns:

Article II Tatarstan's Exclusive Authority Article III Russia & Tatarstan's Joint Authority 1.Protection of human and civil rights, and freedom 1.Guarantee civil rights, and rights of national minorities. 2. Make the Republic's budget, define and impose republic taxes 2.Protect sovereignty and territorial integrity 3. Decide issues of jurisprudence and notary public 3.Mobilization of national economy:production of armaments and military equipment and conversion of defense industry. (shares and participation of both parties to be determined by separate agreement). 4.Regulations of administrative, family and housing relationships, environmental protection and use nature. 4.Settle contradictory questions of citizenship. 5.Grants of amnesty to individuals convicted in the Tatar courts. 5.Coordinate international and foreign economic relations. 6.Possession, use and disposal of land, mineral wealth, water, timber and other resources, including state enterprises, organizations, other movable and immovable property except for units of federal property (state property to be defined by a separate agreement) 6.Coordinate pricing policies. 7. Establish state governmental bodies, their organization and activity 7.Create funds for regional development 8.Decide issues of republic citizenship 8.Pursue monetary policies 9.Establish civil service for citizens who have the right to substitute their service in the armed forces 9. Manage Russia's property in Tatarstan, which are transposed to common management (by separate agreement) 10. Maintain relations, conclude treaties and agreements with the republics, territories, regions, autonomous districts, and with cities of Moscow and St.Petersburg (which shall not contradict three basic documents) 10.Coordinate activity on geodesy meteorology and the calendar system. 11. Participate in international affairs, establish relations with foreign states and conclude treaties (which shall not contradict the three basic documents and participate in international organizations 11.Create funds for common programs, i.e. national disasters 12. Establish a national hank (pursuant to a separate agreement) 12.Coordinate common power system, highways, railways, pipe, air and tubing, communications and information 13. Independently conduct foreign economic activities (the delimitation to he settled by a separate agreement) 13. Management of duty-free movement of transportation, cargoes, and production by air, sea, river,railway and pipe transport 14.Conversion of enterprises (pursuant to a separate agreement) 14.Management of environmental conditions, stabilization, restoration and prevent ecological disasters 15. Establish state awards and honorary titles of the Republic of Tatarstan 15.Implement policy in social sphere: population employment   16.Coordinate health, family protection, education, science, culture, sport; preparation of national specialists for schools, institutions,culture, news media; provide native language literature, scientific research in history and national cultures   17. Personnel for justice and police enforcement   18. Settle litigation, arbitration and notary public questions   19. Crime prevention, coordinate police agencies' activities and security forces   20. Establish common principles for organization of state bodies, and local self-government   21.Establish administrative legislation for labor,family, housing, land, mineral wealth and surrounding environment   22.Common use of land, mineral wealth, water and other natural resources   23.Execute other authority established by mutual agreement

In addition to the 23 items of joint authority that Russia would exercise in Tatarstan. Russia acquired 17 items, where it shall exercise exclusive power in Tatarstan. Some items are stated in general terms, as if they are applicable to the entire Federation. Nevertheless, on appropriate occasions they would apply specifically to Tatarstan: (1) Article IV, listed the adoption and amendment of the Federation's laws and constitution "as well as control of their observance," and the implementation of the "federal system".

Other items of the Federation's authority are (2) protection of the rights of national minorities, civil rights and issues of citizenship; 3) establishment of federal legislative, executive and judicial power; (4) the Federal State property and its management, 5) federal policy and programs for economic, ecological, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federal-ion; (6) establishment of a common market, finance, currency, credit, customs regulation, money supply, general price policy; federal economic agencies. including federal banks; (7) the federal budget, taxes and duties, and funds for regional development; (8) the federal power [energy system], nuclear energy, fissionable materials, federation transport, communication and information systems and space authority; (9) foreign policy and International relations and agreements and questions of war and peace; (10) foreign economic relations of the Federation; (11.) defense and security; (12) state frontiers, territorial waters, air space, exclusive economic area of continental shelf of the Federation; (13) the Judicial System; (14) federal conflict law [law of torts]; (15) the meteorological Service; (16) state awards and honorary titles and (17) federal "state service".

Some of these powers are also listed in Article III joint [joint authorities] This duplication could enable Russia to take action in Tatarstan simply by invoking Article IV without the prior agreement of the Republic; although Article VI states that both sides "shall have no rights to issue any legal acts on issues which do not relate to their area of responsibility." Finally. both sides agreed to have "plenipotentiary representatives in the cities of Kazan and Moscow." [25]Despite their agreement to have "plenipotentiary representatives" in their Capitols, it should be kept in mind that in the exercise of power the sovereigns rarely consult treaties and very seldom observe legal niceties, especially when they deal with their subordinate entities under sensitive political conditions.

In the final analysis, out of the 55 items of authority enumerated in the Treaty, Russia acquired power over 40 items, including 17 exclusive items and 25 joint items, while Tatarstan retained jurisdiction over 15 items of power. If a strong nationalist government came to power in Kazan, the joint authority would become a source of friction between Moscow and Kazan. However, if a compliant regime existed in Tatarstan, then Russian authority would certainly become overwhelming. In that eventuality, Tatar control over 15 items of authority would pale into insignificance.

One month after the signing of the treaty in Moscow, elections were held in Tatarstan for two seats in the Russian Federation's federal council: 58,5% percent of the voters took part in the elections, but in the district of Atnisky 99.7 percent voters went to the polls. President Mintimer Shaimiev with 91.2 percent of the valid ballots and Tatarstan's supreme Soviet Chairman, Farid Mukhametshin, with 71.1 percent of the votes, became deputies to the federal council. In the five districts holding elections to the state Duma, two seats went to the communists, two to candidates supported by President Shaimiev's party (Unity and Progress) and one to a nominee of the local electoral bloc known as equal rights and legality [26].


Russian reaction to the Treaty came from President Yeltsin's administration. The comments of the opposition were basically offered by the Communists. In general, the Treaty was well received by the Russians and had a balming impact on their taut nerves. The fear that Yeltsin Administration had of centrifugal force, leading to Russia's disintegration dissipated. Sergei Filatov, Yeltsin's Chief of Staff described the Russian Federation Constitution, the federal treaty and the bilateral treaty of February 1994 as three major landmarks in the strengthening of the Russian Federation. He indicated that the Treaty with Tatarstan would be an example in arriving at agreements with three autonomous republics, including Kabardino-Balkaria, Bashkortostan and Kaliningrad Province: and also, the most recalcitrant state, Chechnia.

Emil Pain, member of the Presidential Council, described Tatarstan as leading the way in loyalty to Moscow. [27]

Sergel Shakhrai, Deputy Prime Minister, who had vigorously participated in the last round of negotiations between Russia and Tatarstan had, in fact, developed a distinct eleven point nationality policy of his own which had been worked out by his state committee. Briefly, these eleven points include: (1) equal rights for all peoples of the Russian Federation; (2) recognition of the peoples' rights of self-determination; (3) federalism; (4) territorial unity and integrity of the Russian Federation and its members: (5) the depoliticization of nationality policy; (6) reliance on the elected bodies of power whether the center likes them or not; (7) political methods of settling conflict, (8) the indivisibility of economic policy; (9) nationality policy that forestalls crisis. (10) consistency, even in small matters and 11) mandatory consideration of the complexity of Russian societies' religious makeup [28] Shakhrai firmly believed that the threat to the territorial integrity of Russia was not very potent from the oblasts and from the autonomous republics, but that it stemmed from the "discord among the authorities in Moscow." Shakhrai, whose convictions which were not designed to concede sovereignty, or complete autonomy to any unit of the Russian Federation, was naturally, very pleased with the Treaty and saw it as a good omen for the unity of the Russian Federation.

To highlight the new status of Tatarstan within Russia, and to develop the joint mechanisms for implementing the provisions of the Treaty, Yeltsin visited Kazan from May 30-June I, 1994. Yeltsin's route from the airport to the Kazan Kremlin was carefully mapped and the streets were hurriedly paved. Buildings which needed a coat of paint were quickly painted, and he was escorted like a czar into the Kremlin. The reaction of the public in Kazan to Yeltsin's visit was rather subdued. but to Yeltsin the psychology of the public was certainly important: even its indifference was a positive sign of the Treaty's acceptance.

In the Kremlin. the negotiations between the two presidents dealt with these issues: (1) economic problems: (2) the KAMAZ plant damaged by fire and its repairs; (3) modernization and reconstruction of the Kazan airport; (4) building of a new automobile plant; (5) building a bridge over the River Kama; and (6) the launching of new share holding enterprises. For the last project, both presidents agreed that Tatarstan will have a tax holiday for one year and that it would be considered as a joint property of both countries. The tax structure was subjected to a great deal of scrutiny because it was found to be a negative element discouraging foreign investment.

It was discovered that of the 30 percent of taxes earmarked for the federal budget Tatarstan was transferring only 7-6 percent to the Treasury. The Russian Government agreed to offer guarantees to foreign investors for Tatarstan's automobile manufacturing industry, particularly the KAMAZ joint stock company to which the export-import bank of Japan is whining to grant $400 million credit. Both presidents agreed to create a bilateral commission for monitoring the implementation of the Treaty between Russia and Tatarstan. Shakhrai would head the commission for Russia and Vice President Vasily Likhachev would do the same for Tatarstan. The most reassuring element to Yeltsin was the existence of the Treaty which united Tatarstan with Russia, and the knowledge that the mechanisms for the implementation of the Treaty were underway.

While the Treaty uplifted the morale of the Russian public and most political parties reacted positively to this event, critical comments came from the leader of the Russian Federation Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov. He said, "The Treaty with Tatarstan is unacceptable." The reasons for Zynganov's rejection were not based upon the thorough analysis of the Treaty. He said the Treaty "means a creation of a confederation." Even after a casual reading of the Treaty no one could say that a Confederation was created instead of a Russian Federation. To Zyuganov. the mere the fact of Yeltsln negotiating with the autonomous republic's President amounted to the loosening of Mo