Moscow's Bilateral Treaties Add to Confusion

Before the presidential election, President Boris Yeltsin extended federal power-sharing deals to some of Russia's regions. The plethora of bilateral treaties between the center and regions helped mobilize support for Yeltsin - but they created further administrative and economic confusion.

The 1994 Moscow-Kazan agreement signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the President of the Republic of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev - was the first of many power-sharing treaties between Russia and its regions and republics.

A treaty between Grozny and Moscow might have averted Russia's military intervention in Chechnya. A personality conflict between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudaev may have prevented such an agreement.

In the month before the Russian presidential election, the Yeltsin administration moved quickly to conclude a series of bilateral power-sharing treaties with the Russian Federation's republics and regions. The Kremlin presented the wave of treaties as marking a new stage in the development of Russian federalism and the management of vertical challenges to central authority. The treaties are the culmination of a process of bilateralism that began with a power-sharing treaty signed with the Republic of Tatarstan on 15 February 1994. What distinguishes the recent rush of treaty signing is the emphasis on agreements with the regions, which had been previously excluded from sharing power.

The sequence began in January 1996 when treaties were agreed upon with Kaliningrad, Sverdlovsk, and Orenburg oblasts and Krasnodar Krai. By 24 June, Moscow had signed treaties with regions and republics as diverse as Irktitsk Oblast, Ust-Orda Burvat Autonomous Okrug, Chuvashiya, Perm Oblast, Komi-Permyats Autonomous Okrug, Имmi Republic, Khabarovsk Krai, the city of St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast, and the Nizhnii Novgorod, Tver, and Rostov oblasts. Consequently, Russian federalism has developed into a mesh of overlapping jurisdictions and complex interactions between state and substate actors.

Russia is an incongruent federations in that while most of its regions are populated by Russians and are ethnically homogenous, a large number of its republics and smaller administrative units have widely differing ethnic compositions. This ethnically defined federalism, inherited from the Soviet period, was politically destabilizing during 1990-1994. when there was an absence of federal institutions and power-sharing to give expression to these diversities. Throughout this period, republic and regional elites demanded varying degrees of autonomy and power.

There have been three phases in the building of a post-Soviet federal state in Russia. The first phase lasted from the Belavezha Accord of December 1991. which created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). to early 1992 and is known as the "war of sovereignties'' between the federal government and republics and regions. To a large decree. Russian President Boris Yeltsin can be blamed - in August 1990 he incited the republics and regions to "take as much sovereignty as you can stomach.''

Fears that Russia would fragment in much the same way the Soviet Union did proved unfounded, and this phase ended with a negotiated compromise: the Federal Treaty of 31 March 1992. That treaty recognized 18 signatory republics - Tatarstan and Chechen-Ingushetlya refused to sign - as "sovereign republics within the Russian Federation" and granted them much wider powers than the oblasts, krais, and other federation subjects, specifically over the use of natural resources and land. At the same time, the autonomous okrugs - which are ethnically defined, although many have large Russian populations - were raised to the same status as the oblasts and krais. In this way, an asymmetric form of federalism was created, institutionally entrenching the unequal status of the two main groups of subjects - the republics, which were treated as autonomous states within a federation: and the oblasts and other regions, which were dealt with as administrative units of a unitary state. As it was unclear whether the Fedral Treaty superseded the existing constitution, the resulting asymmetric federalism was widely regarded as a source of polillcal instability.[1] Compounding the asymmetry was the fact that horizontal treaties were also being signed among various federation subjects.

During the second phase, from March 1992 to the October 1993 crisis, no consensus on the nature of the federal state could be reached among Moscow. the republics, and the regions. Russia's political elites failed to agree on how to share power. The constitutional assembly's failure in 1993 to resolve that problem - the Tatarstan delegation walked out - was one of the factors that led Yeltsln to dissolve parliament and impose a new constitution, which was subsequently ratified by referendum under controversial circumstances in December 1993. It was also in late 1993 that some regions unilaterally adopted their own constitutions and upgraded their status to "republic within the Russian Federation," notably, Yeltsin's home region of Sverdlovsk. which declared itself a "state."

Sverdlovsk Governor Eduard Rossel said, "Regions can and should handle most questions at home [2]. "Yeltsin dismissed him for pushing regional rights, but Rossel later was elected to his post by an overwhelming majority in 1995.

Yelstln's infamous decree that dissolved the parliament on 21 September 1993. titled "On Phased Constitutional Reform." envisaged an array of measures for state-building beyond the new constitution. Despite this, the new Russian constitution failed to clearly define substantive issues of power-sharing between the center and the federation subjects. Although the draft stated that the Federal Treaty and other treaties were incorporated into the new constitution (Article 11), elsewhere in the document various provisions of the Federal Treaty were amended. As a result, nine republics voted against the new constitution in a referendum, while Tatarstan and Chechnya did not participate. Most pointedly, the word "sovereign" was replaced by the more politically neutral term "republic (state) (in Article 5), and "subjects of the federation (in Article 65). One of the key concessions to the republics in the Federal Treaty, the ownership of land and natural resources, was replaced in the constitution by joint jurisdiction with the federal government (Article 7). An illustration of the ambiguity is that Article 5 confirms that all federation subjects are "equal" (Clause I). but it distinguishes between the "republic (state)'' that has its own constitution and other subjects that have only a charter. According to Article 73, all federation subjects can exercise "full state power" outside of authority held by the federal government or jointly.

Including the regions in the bilateral treaty-making process encouraged their support for the Yeltsin administration, although it did not work in all cases.

Whatever the constitution's uncertainties, an escalating tax war between Moscow and the republics and regions began in late 1993. with the latter withholding federal taxes to compensate for cuts in federal subsidies (see "Moscow's Struggle to Control Regions Through Taxation"). This started the third phase of federalization. marked by the signing of a bilateral power-sharing treaty between Moscow and Tatars tan in February 1994. The treaty itself is merely a broad statement of principles, though some of those are highly significant. The key power-sharing arrangements were detailed in 12 cooperation agreements on major policy areas - economic cooperation, production and transportation of oil, property. customs, environment, higher education, banking/credit, foreign trade, budget, defense, law and order, and military organization - only some of which were published [3].

The Moscow-Kazan settlement - Kazan is the capital of Tatarstan - provoked different reactions. Some analyzed it in terms of Russian foreign policy, seeing it as a model for Russia's relations with some of the former Soviet republics [4]. Moscow-based Russian observers were generally critical, saying the treaty set a "dangerous precedent" that might push Russia down the road of confederation [5]. An aide to President Mintimer Shaimiev of Tatarstan. on the other hand, said it was a means of "dismantling the state structures of the empire'' and was a "sort of buffer" between the Russian and Tatarstan constitutions [6].

The treaty was an important landmark in the development of federalization and state-building within Russia itself, concluding the negotiations with Tatarstan over its declared "sovereign" status and power-sharing that had begun as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Both presidents placed the treaty in the context of building a post-Soviet federations: Yeltsin said. "I have not renounced my formula; 'Take as much sovereignty as you can stomach. Shaimiev said the treaty was an affirmation of the formula "Strong republics, strong center." that was introduced in late 1989 by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev but never realized [7].

Asymmetric federalism was further entrenched by the power-sharing treaty with Tatarstan. which led to a series of treaties in 1994 and 1995 both with the important resource-rich republics of Bashkortostan and Sakha (Yakutiya) and with other republics such as Kabardino-Balkariya. North Osetiya-Alaniya. BuryaEiya. and Udmurtlya. In the case of Sakha. the division of revenues from the diamond industry was 10 be agreed upon annually by a special arrangement between Yellsin and the president of Sakha, Mlkhail Nikolaev [8]. The leaders of three key republics, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Sakha, were concerned that the extension of bilateralism would erode their special status, and they issued a joint declaration in early 1995 warning Moscow that each treaty should take into account the differences between federation subjects [9].

The republic of Chechnya, which split with Ingushetiya in June 1992. was a notable exception to the bilateral treaty club. For three years - from 1991 until the December 1994 invasion - Chechnya was largely left to its own devices. Had a bilateral treaty been concluded with Chechnya. Russia's bloody intervention and the ensuing lens of thousands of deaths could have been alerted. Indeed, at the time of the signing of the Tatarstan treaty Yeltsin's main negotiator, Sergei Shakhrai, said a similar agreement could be the basis of a solution for the Chechnya crisis [11]. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a personality conflict between Yeltsin and Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudaev was a major stumbling block to the inclusion of the Gheehen leadership in the bilateral process. Economic factors also loomed large. Chechnya sits astride the oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea, and in late 1994, negotiations over the "deal of the century'' for the export of oil from Azerbaijan were drawing to a close. Unlike Tatarstan or Bashkortostan, Chechnya has an outside border and was a serious candidate for complete independence.

The asymmetric nature of the treaties with the republics, irrespective of differences in the cooperation agreements, was evident in the terminology used for each republic. The variation in use of terms is not merely symbolic but evidently has bearing on the republics' rights and the extent they share power which the center. As the bilateral process advanced, the federal government seemed to have altered the terminology to limit recognition of forms of statehood. The preamble to the treaty with Tatarstan goes furthest in recognizing state authority, describing it as "a state joined with the Russian Federation" and accepting that, both the Russian and Tatarstan constitutions will regulate the treaty provisions. Subsequent treaties are worded much more guardedly - to the federal government's advantage. However, the economic leverage of Bashkortostan and Sakha evidently earned them more recognition than less economically important republics. The Bashkortostan treaty describes it as "a sovereign state with in the Russian Federation." and accords its constitution equal status with Russia's in the regulation of joint relations. The treaty with Sakha describes the republic as "a state conforming to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of Republic of Sakha (Yakuliya) within the Russian Federation." On the other hand, the republic of Kabardino-Balkariya is described as "a state within the Russian Federation,'' the republic of North Osetiya-Alanlya is listed as "a republic (state) within the Russian Federation.'' the republic of Buryatiya is "a republic (state) - a full subject of the Russian Federation" while Udmurtiya is called merely "a republic.'' The treaties with Buryatiya and Udmurtlya also specifically state that their federal relations are regulated by the Russian constitution.

In 1994-1995, the regions actively lobbied the federal government for inclusion in the bilateral process, seeing it as a way to realize equal status with republics and achieve their principal demand. That demand, as Rossel broadly defined it, was that "everything that lies within the boundaries of regions should belong to the population living in these territories''[11]. Essentially, this demand boiled down to ownership of natural resources and land, wider budgetary and tax powers, and the right to engage directly in foreign economic relations. Those were rights that the Federal Treaty had conceded to republics and more important bilateral treaties had confirmed. However, during his visit to Kazan in May 1994. Yeltsin made it clear that the Tatarstan treaty would not be a model for other republics and regions and that each federation subject would have to negotiate a separate power-sharing agreement. It was only in September 1995 that Yeltsin spoke of extending the bilateral process to the regions.

[1] Federativnyi Dogovor: Dokumentry, Kommentarii [The Fereral Treaty: Documents, Commentary], (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Respublika, 1992) Also see I.Busygina, "Resgionalnoe izmerenie politicheskogo krizisa v Rossii," - [The Regional Dimension of the Political Crisis in Russia] MEMO, No 5,1994, pp.5-17; and Charles Tarlton, "Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculations," The Journal of Politics, vol.27, No 4, November 1965, p.869.
[2] Delovye lyudi, May 1993, p.61
[3] See Elizabeth Teague, "Russia and Tatarstan Sign Power-Sharing Treaty," RFE/RL Research Report, vol.3, No 14, April 1994, pp.19-27
[4] Ibid.. , pp.21,27
[5] Busygina, "Reglonalnoe izmerenie ......" p.10
[6] Raphael S. Khakimov, "Prospects of Federalism in Russia: A View from Tatarstan. Security Dialogue", vol.27, No I, 1996, pp.71,76
[7] Segodnya, 31 May,1994
[8] Rossiskaya federassiya, No 3, 1995. pp.22-23
[9] Khakimov. "Prospects of Federalism ...." p. 78
[10] Segodnya, 17 February,1994
[11] Segodnya. 20 August,1994